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The outcome of the UK’s EU referendum will be driven by a number of key factors, 
many of which might not become clear until after the vote, write Kai Oppermann 
and Paul Taggart. Drawing on insights from EU referendums in other European 
states, they outline what we can know about the campaign and the characteristics 
on which the referendum result will likely turn. 
 
Donald Rumsfeld famously spoke of ‘known knowns’ and ‘known unknowns’. 
Looking at referendums and at the experience of these in Europe up to now, we can 
learn from them to figure out the known knowns and the known unknowns. This 
can give us a better sense of what may happen in the UK’s referendum on EU 
membership. There may be uncertainty ahead, but we can know what we don’t 
know from past experience. We suggest that there are six lessons we can learn. 
  
Referendum Outcomes are Hard to Predict 
 
The one ‘known known’ we have is the state of the polls at the outset. Early in the 
UK’s campaign, opinion polls tell us very little about what the outcome of the 
referendum will be on 23 June. Around 20 per cent of voters are still undecided. 
 
More than that, voting behaviour in referendums is much less settled and more 
fluid than in general elections. Party affiliation and long-term party identification 
matter less in referendums, whereas campaign effects tend to matter more. 
 
The referendum campaign will increase the level of information the average voter 
holds about Britain’s relationship with the EU. The campaign only really began after 
the European negotiations on the UK’s demands concluded on 19 February, and 
voters will hear a lot about the EU from both sides of the debate between now and 
the referendum. 
 
Early polls reflect the balance of opinion in a relatively information-poor 
environment, but the vote will take place in an information-rich environment. This 




EU referendums have been won or lost depending on the ability of the opposing 
sides to mobilise and to turn out the vote. In Ireland, referendums on the Nice 
(2001) and Lisbon (2008) Treaties delivered ‘No’ votes with low turnouts, which 
were primarily down to the poor mobilisation of the ‘Yes’ camps. 
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The ‘Yes’ campaigns learnt the lessons from their respective defeats and, in 
subsequent referendums in 2002 and 2009, they achieved much more effective 
mobilisation of their supporters, resulting in higher turnouts and ‘Yes’ votes to 
overturn the earlier results. 
 
In contrast to the Irish experience, we should not expect a significant gap in the 
mobilisation of the ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ campaigns in Britain’s EU referendum. 
Turnout might well be higher than, for example, at the 2015 general election, when 
it stood at 66 per cent, but it is unlikely to be as high as the 85 per cent achieved in 
the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. What is less clear, however, is which 
camp would benefit from a higher turnout. 
 
Establishment versus Anti-Establishment 
 
A distinctive feature of referendum campaigns is their binary and polarised nature. 
In the case of EU referendums, this generally pits the establishment on the pro-EU 
side against the anti-establishment on the Eurosceptic side. 
 
This tends to work as a magnifying glass for the anti-establishment case, and part 
of the resonance of Eurosceptic arguments in EU referendums precisely comes from 
their anti-establishment appeal. 
 
However, this divide between the establishment and its critics is probably less 
pronounced in the current British referendum than in many previous EU 
referendums across Europe. The case for leaving the EU has become mainstreamed 
in British politics and resonates with parts of the political and economic 
establishment, as well as across large swathes of the print media. 
 
It is still evident, however, that the ‘Leave’ campaign seeks to play the anti-
establishment card, trying to present itself as ‘outsiders’ standing up for the British 
people against Whitehall elites and ‘Brussels’. 
 
Elite Cues Matter 
 
Although party identification is a less important driver of voting behaviour in EU 
referendums than in general elections, cues from elites still matter. In particular, 
such cues will be more powerful, the more united each of the two camps is and the 
more voters trust their leading figures. 
 
However, elite cues on both sides of the debate will likely be weakened by internal 
divisions. The ‘Leave’ camp has difficulty finding a common line on how to engage 
with UKIP and on whether it should officially be led by ‘Vote Leave’ or ‘Leave.EU’. 
 
On the ‘Remain’ side, the cues from the UK government to Conservative voters will 
become weaker the more the Conservative Party and the cabinet are divided. In 
terms of trust, the ‘Remain’ campaign appears to have the advantage, as David 
Cameron is more trusted on the referendum in the public at large than any leading 
figure of the ‘Leave’ campaign, including Boris Johnson. 
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In particular, Nigel Farage divides public opinion and is trusted mainly by those who 
have already decided to vote to leave the EU. His cues will thus be unlikely to sway 




Voters in EU referendums are primed to think about the question on the ballot, in 
terms of the issues that are at the forefront of their minds on voting day. This 
suggests that the outcome of the referendum may be affected by the issues which 
are most prominent in June. 
 
If the issue agenda at the time of the vote continues to be dominated by 
immigration – crowding out, for example, economic arguments and concerns – 
voters will be primed to decide on EU membership in terms of what they think it 
implies for immigration. 
 
This stands to benefit the ‘Leave’ side, which should therefore be expected to focus 
their campaign on the immigration issue. The more the political debate at the time 
of the referendum reflects a more optimistic mood and a broad sense of satisfaction 
with the government and with personal circumstances, the more this should benefit 
the ‘Remain’ side. 
 
The Status Quo and the Consequences of Leaving 
 
Voting behaviour in referendums is marked by a bias in favour of the status quo. 
Voters tend to be risk-averse and prefer the certainty of the status quo to the 
uncertainty of change. 
 
The riskier voters consider leaving the EU to be, the more this benefits the ‘Remain’ 
side. Much of the referendum campaign will therefore become a framing contest 
about the consequences of voting to leave. 
 
The ‘Remain’ campaign will portray leaving the EU as – in David Cameron’s words – 
a ‘great leap into the dark’, economically and politically. The ‘Leave’ campaign will 
make the case that change would be gradual and incremental and that leaving the 
EU would not entail a radical break with the past. 
 
The more voters are dissatisfied with the status quo, and the more they believe that 
they lose out from it, the more risk-acceptant they will become and the more likely 
that they will be prepared to vote against the status quo and for leaving the EU, 
even if this is seen as risky.  
  
This will be a tight referendum. The outcome is hard to predict, but we can learn 
from other referendums. We can be aware, to some extent, of what we don’t know 
on turnout, priming, elite cues and issue salience. These may well have a crucial 
effect in determining the outcome. 
 
But, of course, the other category that Rumsfeld mentioned was the ‘unknown 
unknowns’, or as Macmillan would have it, ‘events’. The key ‘known known’ we do 
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have is that the next few months will matter in determining the outcome of this 
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